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“Too Far from Mecca, Too Close to Peking”:
The Ethnic Violence and the Making of Chinese Muslim Identity,
1821 - 1871

“聖城太遠，皇城太近”
杜文秀起義與雲南回民的身份認同
Jingyuan Qian
Macalester College
jqian@macalester.edu

Abstract: This paper discusses the Han -Hui ethnic conflicts during the 19th century
in Yunnan, China. Between 1821 and 1856 a series of ethnic riots took place between
the dominant Han Chinese and the Hui, a Muslim ethnic group in Yunnan. This
paper attempts to explain how the Hui’s blended identity as both Chinese and
Muslims caused the two ethnic group’s misconceptions of each other, and how these
misconceptions were reinforced by the nation-building efforts of Imperial China.
This paper also sheds lights on the contemporary ethnic relationship on China’s
western frontier.
Key Words: Ethnic Identity, Ethnic Riots, Yunnan, China, Islam.
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I. Ethnic violence in Yunnan, 1821—1856 (Wang 1974, 351-52)

II. Hui Communities in China (purple dots) (Picture courtesy of Igor Tchoukarine)
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III. Hui Muslims in Yunnan, photographed in the backyard of a local Mosque, circa 1880.

IV. The name seal of Panthay Rebellion leader Du Wenxiu, on which both titles in
Chinese and Arabic are presented. The Chinese title reads “Generalissimo of all Armies and
Calvary”, while the Arabic script means “leader of all Muslims”
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I.

Introduction

The year 1821 was a memorable year for China. Prince Minning, after a
grandiose ceremony of succession, ascended the throne and became the sixth
emperor of the Qing Dynasty. When the whole empire was celebrating the
anointment of the new ruler, a brawl among miners in the western province of
Yunnan seemed but a trivial episode. On April 15, 1821, a Han Chinese worker, Xu
Shixiong, defecated in front of the mining camp of Ma Liangcai, a Muslim forem an.
Xu was immediately caught by Ma’s fellow workers, who beat him publicly with a
rod. This trivial dispute suddenly agitated the anti-Muslim sentiment among Han
Chinese miners. Within two days three hundred Han workers gathered in a
Buddhist temple to prepare for revenge actions, while two hundred Muslims, in
response, took up arms to defend themselves in a local mosque. 1 A bloody
confrontation between Han Chinese and Muslims occurred on the night of April 17 th ,
which resulted in 23 people dead and hundreds wounded on both sides. The
unexpected escalation of the situation confused the Governor of Yunnan, who asked,
in his memorial to the Emperor, “why did a trivial dispute like this evolved into a
large-scale unrest?”2
The riot in the Baiyang silver mine was only one example of frequent ethnic
conflicts between Han Chinese and the Hui people, a Muslim ethnic minority native
The Gove rnorate of Yunnan and the Judicial Commissioner’ s Office of Yunnan (1821), The Court Re cord
of the Arme d Fight be twe en Han and Hui in Baiyangchang (Baiyangchang Han-Hui Xie douan 白羊廠漢回
械鬥案), Yunnan Provincial Library. Re tre ived August 20, 2013
2 Original Te xt in Chine se : “臣史等以徐士雄在馬思訓(石曹)門便溺，事甚細微，何致互相糾鬥？”
1
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to Yunnan Province, in the early 19 th century. Large-scale riots also occurred in 1800,
1839 and 1845 respectively, each with increasing violence and degree of organization.
In 1800, Han bandits in Mianning County raided the local Muslim community and
killed over 170 Hui Muslim families. The Muslims responded with a counterattack
several months later. In 1821, a verbal altercation between two Han and Muslim
young men evolved into a full-scale attack on the Muslim neighborhood in Baoshan,
resulting in the massacre of 400 Hui Muslim households. 3 In 1845, a troop of Han
Chinese militia backed by local magistrates stormed the Muslim community in Dali
City and caused over 1400 casualties. 4 The degree of violence in these riots
surpassed most civil unrests in 19 th-century China.
The series of ethnic conflicts finally triggered a massive rebellion of Hui Muslim
people, known as Panthay Rebellion in history. In 1856, several thousands of Hui
people took up arms and occupied the City of Dali, the political center of Western
Yunnan. The Muslim rebels marched eastward and sieged the provincial capital
Kunming and founded a separatist regime called the “Pingnan State”. The imperial
Governor Shuxinga committed suicide after losing control over the province. The
Hui Muslim regime consistently fought with the imperial army in the following two
decades and ended up decisively defeated by the imperial army in 1871.

Lin Quan. 2006. “Du we n xiu qi yi yan jiu” 杜文秀起義研究 (A Re search on Du We nxiu Re be llion). Kun
ming: Yun nan min zu chu ban she . (The Chine se academia no consensus of the actual numbe r of Hui
casualty; this article chooses the commonly referred statistics in academic works). 63.
4 Lin Quan. 2006. “Du we n xiu qi yi yan jiu” 杜文秀起義研究 (A Re search on Du We nxiu Re be llion). Kun
ming: Yun nan min zu chu ban she . 63.
3
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This study explores the cause of ethnic unrest s in the 19 th century Yunnan from
the perspective of identity politics. It begins with exploring the development of the
Hui Muslims’ self-perception in the historical context. The Hui descended from
Persian-speaking Inner Asian immigrants who came to China during the Mongol
Conquest in the 13 th century. In their 600-year interaction with the Chinese society,
two major tendencies heavily impacted the formation of a distinctive Hui identity:
first, their desire to justify their status as legitimate Chinese subjects by assimilating
Chinese customs and culture; second, their hope to preserve their Islamic heritage by
distinguishing themselves from the dominant Han Chinese with their Muslim
practices. The Hui struggled to retain their ancestral identity as Muslims while gain
recognition as Chinese in the society. Many Hui scholars made efforts to reinforce
the internal consistency between Islam and Confucianism by applying Confucian
principles to explain Islamic concepts. The Hui viewed their cultural assimilation not
as a betrayal of Muslim principles, but rather as a necessary compromise to justify
their practice of Islam in the Han-dominated society.
Next, this paper discusses how the Hui’s historical evolution shaped their
contemporary identity in 19 th-century China. On one hand, most Hui people
adopted a significant portion of Chinese traditions and showed little difference from
neighboring Han Chinese in language, appearance, family structure and secular
lifestyle. On the other hand, their religion played the central role in defining their
ethnic identity and clearly distinguishing them from the Han population. The Hui’s
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shared religious belief and cultural practice created a strong group identity that
united them into ethnic enclaves and separated them from the surrounding Han
neighborhoods. The Hui’s partial assimilation to Chinese culture and their religious
heritage as Muslims created ambiguity for their ethnic status in the Chinese society.
This paper then shows how the Hui’s blended identity conflicted with the ethnic
norm of Han Chinese society. The Han’s traditional view of ethnicity, a binary
division of all human beings into “civilized (Hua)” and “barbarians (yi)” categories
based on their degree of civilization. The Han Chinese were considered as “civilized”
and a superior group destined to rule, while all non-Han populace was viewed as
“barbarians” subjected to rule. The imperial courts of Ming and Qing Dynasties
adopted different governing policies toward Han and non-Han peoples based on
this binary categorization. The Han-inhabited regions were governed directly by the
Imperial mandarins appointed by the emperor, while the non-Han population were
allowed to retain their own customary rules and were governed indirectly through
indigenous tribal chiefs. Yunnan, a border province with a significant non-Han
population, was the most significant example of this differentiated governing policy.
The rapid increase of the ethnic Hui population in 19 th-century Yunnan posed a
great challenge to the Chinese view of ethnicity and the empire’s governing
strategies. The Hui did not fit comfortably into either ethnic category. Their
considerable degree of assimilation made them distinct from indigenous peoples
outside the Chinese cultural influence, but their strong Muslim identity prevented
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them from integrating into the Han community. The blended characteristics of Hui
ethnicity defied the existing order of ethno-cultural hierarchy in Yunnan by blurring
the boundary between the Han and the non-Han. The internal solidarity and
self-segregation of Hui Muslim neighborhoods further raised suspicion and anxiety
from outside. M any Han documents in the 19 th century condemned the “weird”
cultural practices of the Hui and depicted the group as foreign, disobedient and
disloyal. The Han society’s prejudice against Hui cultural practice contributed to the
ethnic violence in Yunnan.
The outbreak of Panthay Rebellion in 1857 was the Hui Muslim’s radical response
to the mass violence generated by this identity conflict. The establishment of a
Hui-led regime not only attempted to reshape the Hui’s identity, but also to
overthrow the ethnic norm in the province. The Hui leadership underplayed their
Muslim ancestry and claimed their unquestionable status as Chinese. The rebels
questioned the legitimacy of the ruling Qing Dynasty and claimed their
responsibility as Chinese to save their nation from the b arbaric Manchu rule. The
Panthay Leaders invited the Han Chinese to join the new regime and declared that
Hui and Han, instead of fighting each other, should unite for their shared struggle
against Qing suppression. These policies undermined the ethnic norm in Yunnan
which revealed the Hui as a group hostile to Han Chinese, and consolidated the
Hui’s legitimate status living in the Chinese-dominated society.
This research is only a sketchy review of their ethnic relationship in 19 th century
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Yunnan. It does not aim to examine every specific detail of this historical event, b ut
only to provide some limited insights into the ethnic disturbance faced by Imperial
China during its political transition to modern statehood. In this paper, “Hui people”
and “Chinese Muslims” are sometimes used interchangeably to reconcile the
different terminology in the Western academia.

II.

An Overview of Han-Hui Interactions in History
Historiography of Chinese Muslim Studies

Since the late 19 th century, Western missionaries and scholars have been
discussing the hostile confrontation between the Han and Hui peoples. Emile Rocher
(1886) takes an economic perspective and argues that the struggle for economic
control over Yunnan’s mineral resources raised the nationalist sentiment of the Han
and Hui residents. Bromhall (1900) develops this economic view by arguing that
China’s modernization created the urgent need for raw materials and attracted
massive Han immigrants to the resource-abundant Yunnan. The new immigrants’
failure to compete with the experienced Muslim miners intensified the ethnic
resentment between the two groups and triggered the conflict. However, this theory
cannot explain race riots that occurred in major cities like Baoshan and Dali in which
most perpetrators were local farmers in little contact with Hui community. Also, the
first record of small-scale skirmishes between Han and Hui residents dates back to
the Ming Dynasty, 300 years before the first discovery of mineral resources in
Yunnan.
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In Chinese academia, many scholars also explain the ethnic conflicts from a
socio-economic perspective. Mainstream Chinese historians portray the ethnic
incidents as an inevitable class conflict between an ethnic underclass and oppressive
Han Chinese landlords. Bai Shouyi (1976) argues that “the Hui Rebellion is not
ethnic in nature, but a revolution of the suppressed Hui masses against the
exploitive landlords and gentry.” 5 Lin (1991) interprets the anti-Muslim sentiment as
a propaganda strategy used by Manchu rulers to maintain their shattering rule on
the frontier. Lin argues that by inciting racial hatred against Muslims, Yunnan
residents would turn their discontent of the Imperial Court toward a vulnerable
ethnic minority. Although this interpretation is not entirely false, it overly
exaggerates the economic disparity between the Han and Hui peoples. In fact, the
Hui are the most prosperous ethnic group among all ethnic minorities in Yunnan.
The Hui people traditionally engaged in lucrative occupations such as mining and
the caravan trade, which made them generally better-off than most Han Chinese
peasants. Ironically, it is the economic success and prosperity of the Hui that m ade
Han Chinese describe their propensity as “full of strength, fierce and combative”. 6
Other scholars focus on the ethnic roots of the Han-Hui hostility and explain the
unrests, as being caused by cultural misconceptions between two ethnicities. Wang
Shuhuai (1980) argues that “the misunderstanding between the Han and the Hui,
Bai Shouyi & Zhongguo shi xue hui. 1951. Hui min qi yi 回民起義 (The Muslim Re be llion). Shanghai:
She n chou kuo kuang she ., Pre face.
6 David Atwill. 2005. The Chine se sultanate: Islam, ethnicity, and the Panthay Re bellion in southwe st China,
1856-1873. Stanford, Calif: Stanford Unive rsity Pre ss., p.96
5
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was originally based on mutual enmity and hostility, beginning with simple
misconceptions and discord and then eventually evolving into a battle between the
two groups.” 7 He also explains that the court officials’ failure to reconcile ethnic
relations “was compounded by government officials improperly handling the
situation, causing the Hui to hate the Han and oppose the officials.”

8

In the 21th century, Atwill’s research (2006) makes great contributions to the
field by discussing the incompatible identities of the Han and Hui. Atwill argues
that the Han-Hui ethnic riots were caused by the two groups’ different conceptions
of the ethnic hierarchy in Yunnan. The Han residents perceived Yunnan’s ethnic
makeup as a “binary dualism ” which divided the entire population into the
“civilized” and the “barbarians”. The Hui people distinguished themselves from
both categories and created a dilemma for the Han society to understand and
recognize their identity. The Hui behaved as Han Chinese in language, appearance
and lifestyle, but their adherence to Islam and Islam -related customs distinguished
them from the Han majority and marked their ethnic uniqueness. Their cultural
similarity to the Han and their distinctive Islamic practice formed a dual identity
“betwixt and between” different ethnic categories. Their distinctive religious practice
raised misconceptions of the Han and caused the large-scale violence in the 19 th
century.
Bai Shouyi & Zhongguo shi xue hui. 1951. Hui min qi yi 回民起義 (The Muslim Re be llion). Shanghai:
She n chou kuo kuang she .
8 Ibid.
7
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Atwill’s work starts a new approach in exploring the roots of 19 th-century
Han-Hui ethnic hostility. His analytical framework, however, is not free from
theoretical problems. Atwill’s studies mainly focus on the Han’s perception of Hui
cultural differences and how the Han’s ethnic prejudices evolved into large-scale
violence against the Muslim minority. The 19 th century ethnic conflicts were not
initiated unilaterally by the Han against the Hui, but resulted from mutual
misconception between the two groups. This paper aims to reveal how the Hui
minority viewed the dominant Han Chinese and their own cultural uniqueness in a
Han-dominated society.
Most previous studies only focus on the two groups’ contemporary hostilities in
the 19 th century, but ignore the long-term development of Han-Hui relationship in
history. Since the first arrival of Muslims in China over 600 years ago, the Hui has
been interacting with the Han Chinese. The pattern of interaction and conflicts
between the two ethnic groups was a long-term evolutionary process and underwent
several changes and adjustments. It is important, therefore, to examine how the
historical precedent influenced the Han-Hui mutual distrust in the 19 th century.
Previous studies also rarely investigate Han-Hui ethnic conflicts in a larger
national context. The Hui were not an isolated ethnic group local to Yunnan, but a
transnational ethnic group widely scattered in western China and northern Burma.
Due to their professions in trade, the Hui had a considerable degree of mobility and
formed a close network of Muslim communities beyond the provincial and national
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border through caravan gangs, mosques and madrasahs. As early as the 1860s,
western observers noted that the Han-Hui violence in Yunnan was linked to the
widespread Muslim unrest in Western China since the 1820s. Indeed, many Hui
immigrants from outer provinces played a significant role in the ethnic riots in
Yunnan by initiating the controversies and intensifying the ongoing conflicts. This
paper will attempt to complement previous studies by addressing these questions.
The Hui: An Ethnoreligious Group
To understand the ethnic identity of the Hui people, it is important to examine
how this ethnic group was formed in history. The ancestors of the Hui people
arrived in China as soldiers and retinues of the Mongol Khan during the
Sino-Mongol war of 1294.9 The early Chinese Muslims were a heterogeneous group
of immigrants with diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds. It took nearly three
hundred years, from the late 13 th century to the mid-16 th century, for the cultural
integration to take place and transform early Muslims into a unitary ethnic group.
The intermarriage among Muslim immigrants weakened their ties with their
national origin and created a new ethnic community of hybrid lineage. The Hui is
commonly believed to have evolved as a homogeneous group during Ming Dynasty
(1368-1644).10 Vernacular Chinese replaced Persian to become the Muslims’ new
lingua franca , and the distinctive physical features of Middle Easterners gradually
Marshall Broomhall. 1966. “Islam in China: A ne gle cted problem”, Ne w York: Paragon Book Re print Corp,
p.77.
10 Liu Yingshe ng, “Hui Zu Yu Yan 800 Nian Jian Yao Hui Gu: Cong Bo Si Yu Dao ‘Hui Zu Han Yu’ ”, Zhong
Guo We n Hua Yan Jiu, Vol. 4, 2008.
9
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vanished due to their increasing intermarriage with the Chinese and the conversion
of new members. More importantly, the term Huihui was gradually accepted by both
the Muslims and the rest of society as the standard name for the ethno-religious
group of Middle Eastern descent.

11

The formation of the Hui ethnic group is closely associated with the acculturation
process of Muslims in China. The Muslims’ adoption of Chinese language and
customs became the common ground on which a new Hui identity was built. In the
Ming Dynasty, most Hui males had customarily adopted a Chinese-style name
(guanming) and used it more frequently than their Arabic-style religious name
(jingming).12 Public records also show that m any Hui studied Confucian classics and
participated in imperial examinations for public service. The integration had
alienated the Hui from their remote ancestral lineage and strengthened their new
group status as a Chinese ethnic minority. The Hui became to identify themselves as
“Muslim Chinese (mum‘in)” or “Hui Chinese (hui’min)” rather than merely Muslims
residing in China. 13 Their “Chineseness” became a symbol of Hui group identity
that distinguished them from other Muslim ethnic groups in Central Asia.
Besides the Hui’s adoption of Chinese customs, a more positive form of cultural
assimilation also took place. The Muslims interpreted their unique religious and

Liu Yingshe ng, “Hui Zu Yu Yan 800 Nian Jian Yao Hui Gu: Cong Bo Si Yu Dao ‘Hui Zu Han Yu’ ”, Zhong
Guo We n Hua Yan Jiu, Vol. 4, 2008.
12 Ibid.
13 Atwill, D. G. 2005. The Chine se sultanate: Islam, ethnicity, and the Panthay Re bellion in southwe st China,
1856-1873. Stanford, Calif: Stanford Unive rsity Pre ss., p.96
11
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cultural practices with traditional Chinese concepts. The Hui attempted to prove that
being Muslim was not necessarily being “foreign” and antithetical to Chinese society.
The Huihui Yuanlai, a mythical book that described the early history of the Hui,
attempts to justify the arrival of Muslims in China in a traditional Chinese context:
In the third year of Zhenguan of the Tang Dynasty, on the thirteenth
day of the third month, the Emperor in his sleep dreamed of a m an with
a turban on his head, chasing a monster that had rushed into the palace.
Upon waking, the Emperor was disturbed in his mind, not perceiving
the significance of the portent.
He summoned the Court by a stroke on the golden bell, and all civil
and military officials took place before him. Thereupon the Interpreter
of Dreams stepped out of the ranks and said: “this man is a
Mohammedan of the West. Far beyond Jiayuguan there is a
Mohammedan king of lofty mind and great virtue…… As to a plan for
the present, throw open the pass, and request a sage from the
Mohammedan king to be sent to deal with the threatened evils, that the
country may be kept at rest! 14
The storyline of the “turbaned man” clearly resembles the tale of Buddhism’s
introduction into China in 64 A.D., in which the the Emperor Ming of the Han
Dynasty dreamed of a golden Buddha from the West. The Muslim author of this tale
desired to create an origin for Islam as noble and rem arkable as Buddhism, a
well-respected yet “foreign” religion in China. Such origin stories intended to prove
that the coming of Muslims, just as Buddhists and Taoists, was predicted and
welcomed in the earlier Chinese history and never conflicted with the established
culture of the Han society.
Marshall Broomhall. 1966. “Islam in China: A ne glecte d problem”, Ne w York: Paragon Book Re print Corp,
p.121
14
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Many Muslim scholars also attempted to reinforce the internal consistency
between Islam and Confucianism by applying Confucian doctrines and terms to
interpreting Islamic theology. The earliest Chinese translation of the Quran,
published in 1724, borrowed a large number of Buddhist and Confucian terms to
represent Islamic concepts. For example, the word “God” was translated as zhenzhu,
a Buddhist word for “legitimate ruler”; the word “Prophet (Mohammed)” was
represented by shengren, an honorific originally reserved for Confucius. 15 Another
effort was made by Muslim Chinese scholars, known as “yi ru quan jing,” to use
Confucian moral principles to substantiate the truthfulness of Islamic works. Wang
Daiyu, a prominent Muslim scholar, claimed that “Islam and the Analects of
Confucius are internally one.” 16 Other scholars, like the famous Hui theologian Liu
Zhi, argued in their works that Islam perfectly complements and improves the truth
developed by Confucians. The extensive use of Chinese cultural elements to adapt
Islam was an effort made by Hui scholars to give their ethnic features a legitimate
place in Chinese society.
However, the Hui’s assimilation of Chinese cu stoms should be viewed as a
process of creating a new distinctive identity rather than replacing their ethnic
uniqueness. Their adoption of some “Chineseness” never downplayed their strong
desire to preserve their religious and cultural traditions in a non-Muslim society.

Liu Jie lian (Liu zhi). 1724. [re printe d 1975, Taiwan]. Tian fang zhi sheng shi lu. Taibe i: Guang we n shu ju
you xian gong si. Pre face.
16 Ide m.
15
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Islam, the common religion of the Hui community, played the central role in
defining their ethnic identity and distinguishing them from the Han. A 1827 imperial
memorial reported that “a Han becomes a Hui when he joins the Hui’s religion.” 17 A
17 th-century Muslim textbook also confirmed the religious characteristic of the ethnic
group that “the Han and the Hui were mainly distinguished…by their different
religious teachings (jiao).”18 The most custom ary differences of the Hui ethnicity
were those stipulated in Islam, such as the prohibition of pork, male circumcision,
five prayers in a day, and special religious clothing. The Hui’s preservation of Islam
and Islamic culture in their long shared history marked their different identity from
the Han majority.
The long-term interaction between Hui Muslims and Han Chinese determined
the cultural traits of the Hui ethnic group in 19 th-century Yunnan. According to the
travel records of several Christian missionaries, The Hui Yunnanese were a highly
sinicized ethnicity whose physical appearance and secular lifestyle seemed to show
little difference with the Han Chinese. Their body features were “indistinguishable
from the Chinese” and their apparel “follow[ed] the Chinese fashion.” 19 Despite the
Hui’s apparent similarities with the Han, some missionaries note showed that the

Li Dianrong 2007. “Du We nxiu's Appe al to Be ijing in the Daoguang Re ign”, Studie s in Qing History,
2008(4). Original Te xt in Mandarin: “滇之回民，多由漢民化成。”
18 Ma Changshou. 2009. Ma Changshou min zu shi yan jiu zhu zuo xuan. Shanghai: Shanghai re n min chu ban
she .
19 Marshall Broomhall. 1966. Islam in China: A ne gle cted problem. Ne w York: Paragon Book Re print Corp.,
p.66
17
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Hui was a distinctive ethnic group “whose blood and traditions were blended.”

20

The Western surveyors in the 19 th century generally summarized three unique
aspects of Hui Muslims in Yunnan:
First, the strong internal cohesion of Hui neighborhoods. The Muslims
population was widely spread throughout the province, but almost all Huis lived
within ethnic communities isolated by the surrounding Han area. A typical Hui
community was centered with a mosque where the community members assembled
for prayer and public meetings. The religious clergy (ackhoond or a-hong) served as
the religious and community leader s who m ade important decisions and settled
disputes among Muslim residents. 21 Their shared religion played an important part
in the Hui’s group identity and served as the cohesive force by which the whole
Muslim neighborhood was united. An anonymous Christian clergyman identified
this feature as the main obstacle for their missionary work, since he noted that
Muslims applying for baptism would be “spat on the street by their peers and forced
to hold back.” 22 The boundary between the Hui community and the nearby Han
villages was clear and visible, and any action to infringe upon this border could be
considered an aggression.
The second feature of Hui Muslim life was their specialization in certain
occupations. The majority of Han Chinese engaged in agricultural cultivation. Most
Ibid.
阿訇/阿洪 for Akhood in Mandarin Chine se. –Author ’s note
22 Broomhall, M. 1966. “Islam in China: A ne gle cted problem”, Ne w York: Paragon Book Re print Cor p.,
Pre amble.
20
21
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members of rural Han populations were self-sufficient farmers who possessed or
rented small plots of land for sustenance. In contrast, the Hui population was known
for their specialization in long-distance trade and mining. A European interviewee
reported that “the mafou (muleteers) were almost all Muslim, so as the soldier
escorts......It was by [a Muslim muleteer] that I obtained much information about the
commerce in Yunnan.” 23 Another traveler ’s source recorded that two thirds of the
caravan trade on the route connecting Yunnan and Burma was operated by the
Panthays (Chinese Muslims). Due to the harsh climate and dangerous road
conditions in Southwest China, the Hui caravan traders earned the reputation for
being “rugged in constitution and resolute in spirit to endure hardships and
dangers” 24 . The Hui were also talented miners who had been the first to exploit the
lucrative resources of Yunnan. Emile Rocher, a French Jesuit missionary, recorded
the Muslims’ industriousness to “produce high quality products using primitive
techniques.” 25 A common saying in Yunnan that “there is no mine where there is no
Hui” also confirmed the group’s engagement in mining.
The third characteristic of the Hui is their high mobility beyond the provincial
border. The Muslims’ specialization in trade required them to travel frequently
between Yunnan and adjacent regions including Tibet, Burma, Guizhou and

Marshall Broomhall, 1966. “Islam in China: A ne gle cted problem”, Ne w York: Paragon Book Re print
Corp., p.110
24 David Atwill. The Chine se sultanate: Islam, ethnicity, and the Panthay Re bellion in southwe st China,
1856-1873. Stanford, Calif: Stanford Unive rsity Pre ss, p.40.
25 Emile Roche r. 1879. La province chinoise du Yün-nan. Paris: E. Le roux. Ch.3
23
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Szechuan. In a 1821 census report, the county of Baoshan hosted over 300
households of Hui immigrants from Shaanxi, most of whom travelled to the
province for caravan business. The long-distance travelers also effectively
strengthened the interactions between Hui communities beyond the provincial
border. A memorial to Yunnan’s imperial prosecutor in 1763 noted that “[the
Muslims] formed groups within themselves and convey messages between each
other like a clique”. 26 Since the Hui population was scattered across a wide
geographic range, caravan traders and muleteers played the important role of
maintaining the network between Hui neighborhoods in different areas. The high
mobility of Hui tradesman effectively connected scattered Hui diasporas into a truly
transregional group.
Neither Us nor Them: The Hui’s Ambiguous Identity
Why did the Hui, a Muslim ethnic group with a high degree of assimilation,
become the target of ethnic violence in Yunnan between 1821 and 1856? We cannot
fully understand the reason unless we clearly examine the traditional Chinese view
of ethnicity. Previous scholars (Wang, 1976; Lin, 2000; and Atwill, 2006) noted that
Chinese society’s classification of ethnicity is a dichotomy of the Hua (“civilized”)
and Yi (“b arbarians”) according to a group’s adoption of Chinese culture. The Hua
referred to those who observed Confucian moral principles and behaved culturally

26

Li, D. 2007. “Du We nxiu's Appe al to Be ijing in the Daoguang Re ign”, Studie s in Qing History, 2008 (4)
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as Chinese; the Yi referred to those “barbarous” groups whose rituals and customs
did not reach the Confucian standard of “civilization.” One’s ethnic status was
mainly determined by one’s cultural identity rather than one’s ancestral lineage. The
imperial house of Qing Dynasty, a non-Han Altaic ethnic clan originated in
Manchuria, was considered culturally “civilized” due to their voluntary assimilation
into Chinese culture. The Hua-Yi ethnic distinction assumed a cultural hierarchy
which confirmed the superiority of Confucian civilization over non-Han traditions.
Since the mid-Qing Dynasty, the ethnic policy in multiethnic Yunnan was
predominantly shaped by the Hua-Yi distinction. The Han residents were directly
governed by the imperial governor. The population control system (bianhu) required
every Han household (minren) to report their family size, occupations and land
property to the local registrar. 27 The non-Han indigenous groups, such as the
Hmong, Yi, Bai and Tibetans, were granted considerable autonomy due to their
unfamiliarity with Chinese law. The Imperial Court issued patents to local chiefs and
authorized them to govern the indigenous clans according to their respective ethnic
traditions. This differentiated ethnic policy often resulted in the disparity of legal
enforcements: in the same region, a Han Chinese perpetrator was subject to strict
Imperial penal codes, whereas an ethnic Yi criminal was only punishable by more
lenient customary laws in his native clan.
The rapid growth of Hui Yunnanese population in the nineteenth century posed
27
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a great challenge to the traditional Chinese view of ethnicity in terms of both social
perception and governance. The estimation of Hui Yunnanese population in 1800
ranged from 10% - 30% (Atwill, 2006) to over 40% (Clark, 1910) of the total
population, a percentage hardly negligible by the dominant Han society and the
local government. The Hui’s familiarity with Chinese customs enabled them to have
frequent contacts with the Han population. Unlike the secluded lifestyle of
indigenous peoples in the landlocked mountainous area, the Hui’s highly mobile
occupation as traders, muleteers and miners m ade their cultural difference more
conspicuous to the public. Their exotic Muslim customs confused the Han residents,
who produced several stereotypes to interpret their weird behavior. One common
misconception is that the Hui avoided eating pork because they believed themselves
descended from pigs. This rumor was so prevalent in Yunnan that the Hui
neighborhood in the capital Kunming was even called Zhuji Jie (Pig Assembling
Street) 28 . Their religion was also faced with various mistaken stereotypes. The
recount of Wang Dingan, a Yunnanese scholar-bureaucrat, provided a typical
sinocentric view of “Hui-hui religion”:
Concerning their religion, the Hui always worship and revere their
demon god. They are encouraged to wage a pilgrim age to the tomb of
their religious master [Mohammad], regardless of the length of
distance. Their holy land, also known as Mecca, is eight thousand li
west of Yunnan. Although the Hui has been staying in China for long,
they still adhere to this foreign custom and refuse to change……”29
David Atwill. The Chine se sultanate: Islam, ethnicity, and the Panthay Re bellion in southwe st China,
1856-1873. Stanford, Calif: Stanford Unive rsity Pre ss, p.61
29
Li Dianrong, Du We nxiu's Appe al to Be ijing in the Daoguang Re ign., Studie s in Qing History, 2008(4).
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The Hui’s blended identity as both Chinese and Muslims also incurred
remarkable controversy. Their degree of assimilation in secular life made them
sufficiently qualified as Han Chinese, but their distinctive religious customs
apparently conflicted with the authentic cultural standards of Han-dominated
Chinese society. Their insistence on certain “foreign” traditions raised questions why
they did not adopt the “civilized” lifestyle without reservation. Lu Guohua, a
provincial-level bureaucrat, expressed his concerns with the Hui’s Islamic practices
in the following report to the emperor:
The Hui has been residing in China for such a long time and have
no difference with the Chinese in many aspects. They are supposed to
observe the customs of the Celestial Empire. However, I find that the
Hui consider 360 days as a year, and they secretly designate a certain
day as the beginning of their year. They also prefer the white color in
their daily life and wear a weird white cap all day. I don’t even
understand why they wear it and what deity they worship……
I hereby recommend Your Majesty to order the Hui to follow the
authentic standard of clothing and ban all Mosques. Please make it a
crime for the wearing of a white cap and the use of private calendars.30
Lu’s recommendation, along with m any proposals to regulate the Hui’s
undesirable customs, reflected the government’s uneasiness toward the Hui’s
growing influence in late Qing Dynasty. Official documents cautiously depicted the
Hui as “uncivilized,” “cruel” and “disobedient,” which respectively referred to their
adherence to Islam, endurance of hardship, and gregarious lifestyle. 31 The Hui’s
self-segregation in ethnic enclaves was also seen as a great threat to Yunnan’s
30
31
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security, because, as a local official said, “the Muslims have the natural inclination to
form private cliques and prepare for seditious acts.”32
The difficulty of classifying the Hui into any established category, as well as the
anxiety caused by their exotic Muslim traditions, fundamentally shaped the Qing
Empire’s governing policy toward the ethnic group. On one hand, the government
attempted to downplay the ethnic uniqueness of Hui by subjecting them to the same
governing policy as the Han Chinese. Despite being an ethnic minority, the Hui were
required to register their households and observe Imperial decrees as ordinary
Chinese subjects. On the other hand, the Qing court had provided various special
ordinances to punish the undesirable habits of the Hui and restrict their ethnic
network. 33 One ordinance [1763] specified that a Hui who commits a crime is subject
to harsher punishment than a Han, since “the Hui are naturally disobedient and
habitually violent (xinqi xinghan, kuangye chengxi) .” 34 Another ordinance [1821]
forbade the Hui to carry a weapon when travelling as groups, by claiming that “the
Hui’s gregarious behavior and violent nature made them much more dangerous
than bandits…which deserves great caution.” 35 These regulations demonstrated the
two main purposes of the Qing Dynasty’s Hui policy: to eliminate their ethnic
Li Dianrong. 2007. “Du We nxiu's Appe al to Be ijing in the Daoguang Re ign”, Studie s in Qing History,
2008(4)
33 In the Chine se le gal context, the li, or “spe cial ordinances”, are appendices to a law providing de tails and
e xce ptions concerning its applicability. The Hui policy we re include d in the li attached to Empire ’s pe nal
code , since they provide e xceptions of applying the law to a spe cific e thnic group.
34 Wang Dingan, 1887. “The Re cord of Impe rial Xiang Army (Xiangjun Ji 湘軍記)”, Yunnan Provincial
Archive . Original te xt in Chine se: “心齊性悍，獷野成習”
35 Li Dianrong. 2007. “Du We nxiu's Appe al to Be ijing in the Daoguang Re ign”, Studie s in Qing History,
2008(4).
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uniqueness, and to destabilize the internal coherence of the Hui community.
The Hui’s Clash with An Emerging Chinese Nation
By examining the Hui’s development in history, the co-existence of Chinese and
Muslim characteristics in the Hui’s ethnic makeup was the underlying cause of the
ethnic hostility between 1821 and 1856. The Hui’s blended identity was viewed as
antithetical to the homogenous Han society and the Chinese nation-state. Their
similarities in custom and lifestyle with the Han Chinese allowed them to participate
as members of Chinese society and increased their visibility to the public as traders,
merchants and miners. Their frequent interaction with the Han society also made
their unique ethnic lifestyle conspicuous to a homogenous people and incurred
considerable anxiety and uneasiness from outside their ethnic enclave. In
comparison, the unassimilated indigenous groups in Yunnan, due to their secluded
lifestyle and large cultural difference with the ethnic Han society, remained
segregated from the mainstream social scene and thus less likely to be the target of
ethnic hostility. The Hui’s high mobility and visibility did not help them culturally
integrate into the Han society, but made their outsider characteristics even more
apparent to the ethnic majority.
The court records of ethnic riots substantially support this hypothesis. In the
ethnic riot of 1821, several Han perpetrators mentioned their discontent with a Hui
mosque on the main street in the resource-abundant town of Baoshan, stating that
“every time a [Han] divine ceremony passed the mosque gate, the Muslim students
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in the mosque always showed contemptuous attitude and laughed loudly…Their
lack

of

seriousness during the ceremony

always

infuriated other

[Han]

participants.” 36 In a culturally homogenous society where every member was
expected to conform to its cultural norm, an ethnic minority’s insensitive response to
symbolic cultural events was likely to cause misunderstanding and hostility.
Similarly, the direct cause of the 1845 riot, was an ethnic slur uttered by a Han young
man in an integrated teahouse.

37

The Hui customers immediately responded by

more pejorative slurs and incurred an intense verbal exchange between the two
groups. Although this verbal dispute seemed to be a trivial incident, it nevertheless
reflected the ingrained cultural misconception between the two groups and
intensified the situation. Those culturally insensitive events played the role of a
“cataclysm” that transformed the Han’s latent anti-Hui mentality into violent
practices.
Another important contributor to the ethnic riots in Yunnan is the government
policy. Starting from the late 18 th century, the Imperial Court attempted to
consolidate its control over frontier territories and converted the decentralized,
multinational empire to a single nation-state. This power consolidation, known as
Gaitu Guiliu, took the form of both government coercion and cultural assimilation. In

The Gove rnor ’s Office of Yunnan and the Judicial Commissioner’s Office of Yunnan (1821), “The Court
Re cord of the Arme d Fight be twe en Han and Hui in Baiyangchang (Baiyangchang Han-Hui Xie douan 白羊
廠漢回械鬥案)”, Yunnan Provincial Library.
37 Scholars disagreed on what spe cific profanity that that Han man shouted to Muslims. The commonly held
vie w, supporte d by Hui scholar Bai Shouyi, be lie ves it to be a comparison of Muslims with pigs.
36
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1724 the government appointed Han Chinese magistrates to oversee the indigenous
chiefdoms in Yunnan and weakened the autonomous power of local tribal leaders.
At the same time the government organized mass Han immigration to frontier areas
to stabilize the ruling order and “civilize” the non-Han native peoples in the
province. The traditional Hua-Yi ethnic concept was merged with the growing
awareness of a unitary Chinese nationality, and one’s cultural similarity was
increasingly connected with one’s political allegiance to the state. In the early
nineteenth century documents, several new words such as “seditious traitors”,
“traitors to the Han” or “non-Han traitors” was coined to describe the non-Han
bandits in Yunnan. The new metaphor suggested a causal relationship between their
criminal acts and their cultural disobedience to the state.
In the context of the nation-building process, the Hui’s strong m aintenance of
Muslim customs was not merely considered an exotic cultural practice, but also
indicated their lack of loyalty to the emerging nation-state. During the ethnic riots,
the local magistrates played an important role in intensifying the ethnic riot and
supporting the violence against the Hui. In the 1821 riot, when the Hui community
leader reported to the local governor the escalation of violence, the local magistrate
had no formal response to their complaints. One year later, the organized
counterattack of the Hui against the Han neighborhood was considered as “sedition”
by the magistrate, who ordered several thousand troopes to suppress the
“disobedient behavior of Hui bandits”. The partiality of imperial officials in these
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incidents justified the violence of the Han rioters and intensified the ethnic hostility
between the two groups.
In conclusion, the antagonistic sentiment toward Hui people reached its peak in
early 19th century. The hatred toward Hui people was caused by the group’s
ambiguous ethnic identity. As an assimilated minority group, the Hui adopted
considerable Chinese characteristics and formed a self-identity as Chinese nationals.
Their Muslim heritage, however, marked their distinctiveness as an outsider group
from the Han Chinese perspective and made them subject to negative stereotyping.
The Hui people’s mixed cultural traits also blurred the ethnic categorization of
Hua(civilized) and Yi (barbaric), and obstructed the Empire’s modernizing efforts to
build a nation-state. The hostility between Han and Hui peoples resulted in severe
ethnic riots in Yunnan and finally led to the Muslim -led Panthay Rebellion against
the Qing Empire.
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III.

The Panthay Rebellion and Ethnic Reconstruction
The Panthay Rebellion: A Historical Overview

“Panthay”, a Burmese word borrowed from Chinese word panzei (traitors), was
used by British observers to name the Hui Muslim uprisings from 1857 to 1871. In
May 1857, a group of Hui Muslim peasants suddenly stormed Dali, the largest city
of western Yunnan, due to the rumor that local Han gangsters were planning a
massacre of all Muslims. Angry Muslims soon occupied the whole city, killed the
local magistrate, and raised the white flag on the city wall. In the next three days, all
informed Muslims in Yunnan took up arms and formed a troop of 30,000 people.
The Governor-General, Shuxing’a, committed suicide after Dali fell into Muslim
hands. The rebels soon occupied most western Yunnan and marched east toward the
province capital Kunming. Despite huge casualties on the Hui side, the rebels took
control of Kunming in 1859 and temporarily drove the imperial force out of the
province.
The success of Panthay Rebellion in overthrowing the imperial administration in
Yunnan gave birth to a new state, the Pingnan State (pingnan guo), led by rebel
leader Du Wenxiu. The nature of the new regime rem ains a central question to
observers. M any Western scholars termed the regime as a “sultanate”, which bears
the connotation that Panthay State should be viewed as a part of the Islamic world.38
This argument is intuitively reasonable, given the fact that the regime was founded
38
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by, and consisted of, Yunnanese Muslims. However, the major weakness of this
view is that the Panthay regime lacks most typical features of an Islamic state: the
clerics had no influence over the state affairs, no Sharia law is imposed on its
subjects, and the Muslim leaders never adopted Islamic-style honorifics (sultan or
caliph) for their leadership position. During the regime’s 14 years of existence, its
politics remained secular in general, and its institutional structure observed a clear
separation of church and state.
Another major view, mostly accepted by Chinese and Taiwanese scholars,
claims that the Panthay state is no different than other contemporary peasant rebel
regimes in restive 19th-century China. Similar to the Taiping Rebellion in Canton
and the Nian Militias in the Chinese Far West, the Panthay rebellion is just another
angry reaction of Chinese peasants against the corrupt imperial rule. This view
underplayed the rebels’ Muslim character and emphasized their economic status as
underprivileged peasants. However, the Panthay rebellion differs remarkably from
typical peasant rebellions in two aspects. First, the cause of the Hui’s rebellion is not
economic hardship, but ethnic intolerance agitated by the Imperial Court and local
Han militia. Second, the major leaders of the Panthay regime came from the local
intellectual class, most of which received formal education in both Confucian and
Muslim way. Suleiman Du Wenxiu, the regime’s supreme leader, held an imperial
exam degree and was known for his mastery of Classical Chinese literature. The
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conception that Panthay Rebellion is a “peasant revolt” apparently oversimplified
the real scenario.
The preserved written evidence of the Panthay State, although limited in
number, can be used to restore the political institution of the regime. 39 These sources
include 1) official documents, such as decrees and resolutions issued by Du Wenxiu
and his military government; 2) private letters, especially those between senior Hui
officials, military leaders and local elders; 3) diaries and records written by local
intellectuals, including ethnic Han and Hui, residing in the Muslim -controlled
region between 1857 and 1871. Unfortunately, most written evidence was destroyed
by the Qing officials immediately after the Panthay defeat in 1872, and those
documents preserved today can scarcely reflect the entire scenario of the short-lived
regime. But a careful review of those available sources can offer us valuable
information about the political agenda of the newly-founded regime.
This chapter discusses three important findings that will contribute to the study
of Panthay political structures. 40 First of all, the Hui Muslims did not monopolize
the political power of the rebellious province. The regime’s leadership was ethnically
inclusive, where all three ethnicities – Han, Hui and Yi peoples – are represented in
the new authority. More surprisingly, the supreme leader, Suleiman Du Wenxiu, is
The institutions that maintain Panthay-era documents include s: the Prefectural Muse um of Dali City
(he re after, PMDC), The Pre fe ctural Archive of the Dali City (PADC), Yunnan Provincial Archive (YPA) and
Yunnan Provincial Library (YPL).
39
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not an ethnic Hui, but a half-Han Chinese adopted and raised in a Muslim family.
Among the rank-and-file soldiers in the rebellious army, Han Chinese and
indigenous Yi people constituted the majority of the military force. Based on these
facts, the perceived conception that Panthay Rebellion is an ethnic uprising of Hui
people in Yunnan is questionable.
Ethnic issues, which triggered the outbreak of the Panthay Rebellion,
continued to be an important problem for the rebel leaders. Since the Panthay
rebellion is initially a Muslim reaction to the Han militia’s violence, many
anticipated that that the new regime would launch a bloody counterattack against
the Han Chinese. Many Han landlords, especially those involved in Anti-Hui revolts,
were prepared to escape the province to prevent a Muslim revenge. The Panthay
authorities attempted to pacify the public‘s anxiety by clarifying that the rebellion
was not anti-Han in nature. The Generalissimo argued that the Han and Hui were
originally “brothers and friends”, but the Qing court intentionally instigated the
mutual hatred between two peoples and was responsible for the tragedy. Since both
Han and Hui were victims of the government misdeeds, the mission of this rebellion
should be overthrowing the corrupt government and reuniting two peoples under
one union. This explanation blamed the government, instead of the Han Chinese, for
causing the ethnic conflict and gained much support from local Han population.
Another important finding is that despite the rebellion’s non-Han nature, the
leadership used Chinese nationalism to justify their rule over a predominantly Han
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province. The official proclamation claimed that although the Han and Hui were
two “religions”, they are both Chinese subjects and obliged to save China from the
Manchu Empire’s barbaric rule. The Panthay regime adopted a wide range of
traditional Chinese symbols, including clothing style, flags and calligraphy, to
distinguish it from the ethnic Manchu patterns of Qing Dynasty. On many occasions
the Panthay leaders also publicly stated the rebellion’s mission as “reviving China
and destroying the barb arians (Quchu Dalu, Huifu Zhonghua )”. By embracing
Chinese nationalism the Panthay leaders attempted to strengthen the regime’s
cultural orthodoxy to govern a predominately Han province.
The third finding is that, according to existing documents, the Panthay regime’s
political institution shows remarkable Chinese characteristics. The Panthay authority
borrowed the government structure of Han Dynasty – the strongest dynasty in
Chinese history. The official titles of Panthay bureaucrats, such as Silu, Sima or
Sikong, were archaic Chinese honorifics existing only in Classical Confucian books.
However, the Panthay polity also showed m any innovative features. The regime
was not a monarchy in which the Generalissimo had absolute power; instead, a
deliberative council (yishi tang) consisted of civil and military leaders collectively
made important decisions. This decision-making body closely resembled the way
village elders in Yunnan decided local affairs. All those evidence showed that the
Panthay regime was not a “Sultanate” which showed no significant characteristic of
an Islamic state.
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Why did the Panthay State, a short-lived regime founded by rebellious Muslims,
contain so many apparent Chinese features? In order to answer this question, one
should again understand the Hui Muslim’s ambiguous dual identity. To most Hui,
Islam faith is just a personal faith practiced in the private sphere, but never a
political ideal that should be promoted in the society. As a result of 800-year
assimilation, the Hui never saw their Islamic faith as antithetical to their political
identity as Chinese nationals. The Panthay leader’s adoption of Chinese governing
model was also a practical strategy. Given that the majority of Yunnan residents
were ethnic Han Chinese, it is necessary for Muslim leaders to gain popular support
by respecting their political tradition. Therefore, the Panthay regime’s lack of Islamic
features is nothing but reasonable.
This chapter will use both primary and secondary evidence to strengthen this
argument. The primary sources include the archival records of Panthay State,
including proclamations, appointment letters and legal codes between 1857 and 1871;
the secondary resources includes historians’ narratives, both by the Chinese and
foreigners, in different time periods. Among all the precedent research, Bai Shouyi’s
Huimin Qiyi (The Muslim Rebellion) and David Atwill’s Chinese Sultanate provided
the most comprehensive resources and are cited most frequently. In order to prevent
repetition, the “Panthays”, “Huis” and “Chinese Muslims” are roughly synonyms
and are used sometimes interchangeably in this article.
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The Ethnic Makeup of the Panthay Regime
Most previous observers considered the Panthay Rebellion as an ethnic revolt
by Hui minorities against the dominant Han population. John Anderson (1876), the
earliest chronicler of Chinese Muslims, depicted the reb ellions as “a Mohammadan
riot against the Chinese who were threatening the Panthay town”. 41 The rebellion
gave rise to a “Mohammadan king”, Du Wenxiu, who “hold his court in Dali”. Bai
Shouyi (1956) also defined the Panthay Rebellion as a “Hui peasants’ col lective
resistance against the Han landlords”.

42

These views perceived the Panthay

Rebellion simply as a Hui-versus-Han conflict where only two ethnic groups
involved.
More recent research showed a different perspective. David Atwill (2006) argues
that the Panthay Rebellion cannot be explained solely in an ethnic context. Atwill
marked the difference between new Han immigrants who came in the 19 th century
and local Han inhabitants who resided in Yunnan for generations. He argues that
the rebellion is a response to the aggressive behavior of new Han “colonizers”,
rather than the Han population who coexisted peacefully with other groups.
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He

also found that the Panthay Rebellion is a multiethnic involvement where many
ethnic groups joined the Muslim s in the resistance. Li Wenxue, an ethnic Yi

John Ande rson. 1872. "Chine se Mohammedans". The Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Gre at
Britain and Ire land. 1: 147-162.
42 Ibid.
43 David Atwill. 2005. The Chinese sultanate: Islam, ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in southwest China,
1856-1873. Stanford, Calif: Stanford Unive rsity Pre ss. 26.
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(“barbarian”) who suffered from Han occupation of his land, led his indigenous
tribesmen join the rebellion and pledged allegiance to Du Wenxiu. 44 Atwill even
found many impoverished Han peasants who chose to join the Muslim rebels as a
way of survival. 45 Therefore, Atwill defined the rebellion as multiethnic rather than
a Hui-against-Han ethnic riot.
On the individual level, the ethnic identity of Hui rebel leaders was also
ambiguous. Many Western resources refers to the rebellion’s major leader, Du
Wenxiu, as “Sultan”, an Islamic title that suggested his undoubtable Muslim identity.
A brief survey into his family background and early life will greatly undermine this
statement. Contrary to the wide conception that he is a Hui, Du’s biological parents
were both Han Chinese. His father died shortly after his mother became pregnant,
and he was born into a Muslim family since his mother remarried a Hui tradesm an.
As a stepchild, he is given the Muslim last name Yang and an Arabic name Suleiman
by an imam of a local mosque. Although a Muslim, he received Confucian-style
education at a traditional Chinese academy ( xiangxue) and showed great talent in
classical Chinese literature.
Du Wenxiu’s early adulthood witnessed a gradual awareness of his Han
Chinese legacy. At the age of eighteen he passed the local examination and achieved
the scholar’s degree (xiucai). His academic achievement made him proud of his
David Atwill. 2005. The Chinese sultanate: Islam, ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in southwest China,
1856-1873. Stanford, Calif: Stanford Unive rsity Pre ss. 30.
45 Li Dianrong. 2007. “Du We nxiu's Appe al to Be ijing in the Daoguang Re ign”, Studie s in Qing History,
2008(4) –Translation mine .
44
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ancestral legacy, and he changed his family name to Du, the family name of his Han
Chinese ancestors. He also worshipped the ancestral graveyards to honor his
ancestral lineage – a traditional ritual for new-elected scholar-bureaucrats. 46 Du’s
recognition of Han Chinese legacy had never affected his strong self-identity as an
ethnic Hui and a Muslim, but his hybrid cultural background had prevented him
from seeing Han and Hui as two distinctive and adversary groups.
Another important rebel leader, Ma Rulong, also had an interesting biography
that also showed a certain level of ethnic ambiguity. Ma was the second -highest
commander of the Panthay troop before he defected to the Qing army in 1861. He
came from a noble origin whose ancestors served the Chinese emperor as a court
guard in Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). He was ambitious to serve in the Imperial Army
and obtained the first rank in the Imperial military exam, but the increasing Han
assault of his local community forced him to join the rebel force. He expressed a
different ethnic view and disputed the cause of rebellion in his 1862 letter to Du
Wenxiu. He believed that Hui and Han were “one people only divided by their
religious beliefs”, rather than two hostile ethnic groups. He also expressed his
loyalty to the empire and argued that the rebellion is only a “defensive action”
against local Han bandits rather than a revolution against Han Chinese in generals.
He persuaded Du to prevent the escalation of the conflict and surrender to the

46 Lin Quan 2006. “Du we n xiu qi yi yan jiu 杜文秀起义研究 (A Research on Du We nxiu Re be llion)”. Kun
ming: Yun nan min zu chu ban she . 30-44.
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imperial force “as soon as possible”. His opinion represented the views of many Hui
rebels --- that the rebellion should be a resistance to local injustice rather than an
ethnic revenge against a hostile people. 47
On the level of rank-and-file insurgents, there is no accurate data showing what
portion of the rebel force are ethnic Hui Muslims. However, most sources indicate
that the Panthay soldiers were multiethnic in a large degree. Atwill (2006) and Bai
(1952) both cited a significant number of non-Muslim indigenous people, such as Yi,
Bai and Hmong, led by indigenous chieftain Li Wenxue, to join the rebellion. Lin’s
research (2001) cited a decree that allows Han soldiers to consume swine in a
separate camp from the Muslims, which shows that a certain number of Han
Chinese existed in the rebel force. These sporadic sources all suggested the ethnic
diversity among the rank-and-file combatants.
From this perspective, the traditional view accepted by Western scholars--- that
Panthay Rebellion was an extension of historical Han-Hui conflicts and aimed to
establish an Islamic Sultanate --- is questionable. The rebellion’s leadership did not
have a strong ethnic consciousness, and its participants were composed of multiple
ethnicity. If ethnic hatred was not the actual cause, then what motivated the people
to take up arms? What political agenda did the rebels aim to achieve by this uprising?

“A Le tte r to Du We nxiu”, Bai Shouyi and Zhongguo shi xue hui. 1951. Hui min qi yi 回民起義 (The
Muslim Re be llion). Shanghai: She n chou kuo kuang she . Vol.2, 97. An inte rnal publication pre served at
PADC
47
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An appropriate answer to this question will depend on the existent written sources
of during the Panthay Rebellion.
Leading Ideology of the Panthay Rebellion
If the Panthay rebellion, as elaborated in the previous chapter, is not an
ethnically-oriented conflict, what ideology did the rebels use to justify their defiance
of imperial rule? A study of Panthay-era written records lead to a surprising finding:
the Panthay leaders used Chinese nationalism as the rebellion’s ideological
foundation. The rebels repeatedly claimed that the Manchu Dynasty was a “tartar
barbarian” regime that had no legitimacy to rule, and the rebellion’s ultimate goal
was to restore the Chinese civilization from the suppressive Manchu rulers. 48 An
important question then rises: how can the rebels justify their claim of Chinese
sovereignty, when the majority of them were actually non-Han? Some Panthay
documents showed how a non-Han regime reconcile the inconsistency between their
non-Han identity and the rebellion’s nationalist goals.
One remarkable document, The Muslim’s Proclamation of War in Jianshui
(Jianshui Huimin Xiwen) stated in the beginning paragraph that

…We the Muslims, no different than Han Chinese, are granted
good nature by Heaven. We have adopted the Central Kingdom’s
civilization for a long time. Since the beginning of the dynasty, we
produced countless loyal courtiers and model children in the

“Xingshi Xiwe n”, Bai Shouyi and Zhongguo shi xue hui. 1951. Hui min qi yi 回民起義 (The Muslim
Re be llion). Shanghai: She n chou kuo kuang she . Vol.2, 129. An inte rnal publication pre se rved at PADC
48

nation’s long history…49
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This statement attempts to broaden the ethnic category of “Chinese” and
argue that Hui Muslims are no different than Han Chinese in their cultural heritage.
By emphasizing Hui’s long history of assimilation, the rebel leaders attempt to
justify that Hui and Han are both legitimate heirs of the Chinese civilization.
Therefore, when Chinese civilization is endangered, the Hui also shares the
obligation to save China’s cultural authenticity from barbarian rules.
Many war proclamations (xiwen) issued by Panthay regime showed similar
rhetoric that the Hui bear the moral obligation to rescue China from barbarian rule.
An 1861 proclamation openly claims that
The goal of this offensive is to revive the Han; therefore, no
killing of civilians should be conducted. If the troop meet Han
people on the way, we should clarify our missions and gain their
support. It is necessary to unite Han and Hui to take revenge
against the Qing. 50
Those Panthay-era documents showed a mixed view of disdain and sympathy
toward the Han population --- disdain for their collaboration with the Qing rulers in
massacring the Muslims, and sympathy for their subordinate status under a
barbarian empire. Some Panthay writings even depicted the rebellion as the Hui’s
heavenly mandate – a mission to enlighten the Han Chinese and help them restore
the Chinese civilization from the ruins.
“Jianshui Huimin Xiwe n”, Bai Shouyi and Zhongguo shi xue hui. 1951. Hui min qi yi 回民起義 (The
Muslim Re be llion). Shanghai: She n chou kuo kuang she . Vol.2, 53. An inte rnal publication pre served at
PADC.
50 “Xingshi Xiwe n”, Bai Shouyi and Zhongguo shi xue hui. 1951. Hui min qi yi 回民起義 (The Muslim
Re be llion). Shanghai: She n chou kuo kuang she . Vol.2, 129. An inte rnal publication pre se rved at PADC
49
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Du Wenxiu’s personal records, including some unpublished manuscripts,
frequently reflected his ambition to revive the Han national spirit. A calligraphy
hanged in his study reads:

51

What a hero I am, sent by Heaven, to restore the Chinese land!

天降英雄挽回中华世界
What a hero I am, dispatched by the Earth, to overthrow the Tartar’s reign!

地遣豪杰踏破胡儿乾坤
Du Wenxiu’s another calligraphy scroll, initially a gift to his cousin-in-law,
expressed his political platform more explicitly:

联回、汉为一体

To unite Hui and Han as one,

驱除鞑虏

To expel the Tartar barbarians,

恢复中华

To revitalize China52

These writings clearly demonstrate Du Wenxiu’s self-conception as a savior of
all Chinese people sent by Heaven, who bears the responsibility to restore Chinese
civilization from tyranny. It is worth noted that “to expel the Tartar barbarians” later
became a popular nationalist slogan used by anti-Qing revolutionaries, which was
famously adopted by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen (1866-1925) during the 1912 Revolution. The
Confucian idea of “Heavenly Mandate” effectively resolved the inconsistency
between the Panthay’s non-Chinese ethnicity and their claim of Chinese sovereignty.
The rebels believed that since the Han Chinese was incapable of restoring their lost

51
52

“Lian’e Lu”, A se rie s of calligraphy scrolls by Du We nxiu pre served in the e xhibition room, PMD.
“Lian’e Lu”, A se rie s of calligraphy scrolls by Du We nxiu pre served in the e xhibition room, PMD.
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land and civilization, the Heaven had transferred this obligation to the Hui – a
non-Han group yet an equal subject of China.
The cultural symbolism used by the rebel arm y also reflected their attempt to
reconstruct a “real” Chinese identity. The rebel leaders claimed to adopt the clothing
of Ming Dynasty --- the last Han-dominated regime in Chinese history. A local
historian recorded that “the Muslims… cut off their hair queues, burned their
Manchu ropes, and put on Ming-era white ropes which was forbidden after the
Manchu takeover... ” The change of clothing style was considered by rebel leaders as
a “return to cultural authenticity (huifu zhengsu)” and a rejection of Qing Dynasty’s
legitimacy.
Besides the nationalist ideology, the Hui rebels also uses the Qing Dynasty’s
bad governance to justify their uprising against the empire. The rebels’ political
writings include a pervasive condemnation of the Qing court’s corruptive rule,
including its inability to resist foreign invasion, heavy taxation, and suppressive
social policy. The rebel leadership claimed that, since the Qing court imposed so
much suffering on the people, it had lost its legitimacy to govern China.
The most remarkable evidence of this ideology is a handm ade diagram of early
Panthay leaders, titled “Situation of Manchu Empire”. The diagram showed a circle
divided into four parts, each of which displays the words “frequent foreign
aggression”, “an incapable emperor ”, “a corrupt bureaucracy of thieves” and “an
empress dowager who controls politics”. All four sides points to the center of the
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circle, which reads “a doomed country and a suffering people”. The diagram also
provide the solution to the crisis, which is “a people’s revolution”. This diagram
demonstrated the Hui’s strong discontent of the regime’s dysfunction and their
resolution to rebuild a well-governed polity through revolutionary means. This
diagram also showed the Hui’s perception that their sufferings are caused by the
Imperial Court rather than local m agistrates. Compar ed to previous small-scale
ethnic riots, this rebellion pursued a larger political agenda --- the overthrow of Qing
court nationwide. (See photo below)

“Situation of the Manchu Empire ”, a graph made by Du We nxiu, photographe d by Qian Jingyuan in August
19, 2013, e xhibition at PMD Yunnan.

In their official propaganda, the Panthay rebels repeatedly mentioned the
disastrous consequences of

the Qing court’s bad governance.

In

“Public
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Proclamation to Yunnan Residents”, General Ma Rulong compared the local
bureaucrats as “dogs and mice” who “abuse their powers to achieve personal gains
regardless of the survival of people.” He also pointed out that local bureaucrats
“manipulated the public sentiment … and caused Han and Hui, two brotherly
peoples, to fight under one roof ”. Du Wenxiu’s military declaration Xinshi Xiwen
also made a smiliar statement that “The suffering people were in an urgent state, but
the demonic bureaucrats still led comfortable and luxious lives, as if nothing had
happened… They abandon the people like throwing a rubbish.”53
Following their accusation of Qing bureaucrats, the Panthays then publicly
promised to build a better government to improve the well-being of local people. In
the Xingshi Xiwen (Announcement of Military Discharge), Du Wenxiu publicly
stated that “after our heroic military pacified the area…the peace and happiness of
the people will be better preserved…” 54 General Ma Rulong, in his “Public
Proclamation to Yunnan Residents”, also expressed his plan to establish good
governance in the province. The document began by an accusation of local
bureaucrats for “harassing the innocent civilians and disturbing social virtue”. It
declared the rebel’s commitment to promote social justice and exterminate “the
chronic disease of the province’s governance”. 55

“Xinshi Xiwe n”, Bai Shouyi and Zhongguo shi xue hui. 1988. Hui min qi yi 回民起義 (The Muslim
Re be llion). Shanghai: She n chou kuo kuang she . Vol.2, 133. An inte rnal publication pre se rved at PADC.
54 Ibid.
55 “Xiaoyu Dianhuan She nmin”, Bai Shouyi and Zhongguo shi xue hui. 1988. Hui min qi yi 回民起義 (The
Muslim Re be llion). Shanghai: She n chou kuo kuang she . Vol.2, 69. An inte rnal publication pre served at
53
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The Panthay’s claim to improve people’s livelihood was not simply a
propaganda, however. In Du Wenxiu’s private letter to his distant cousin Yang
Zhengpeng, the leader elaborated his policy agenda for relieving taxation, reducing
corruption and maintaining public order, as a “strategy to gain public support for
our revolutionary cause”. A Panthay-era military brochure demonstrated the rebel’s
efforts to protect the local livelihood. It provided death penalty for “disturbing local
peace”, including raping, robbing and breaking into private homes. It even specified
that if a family have economic hardship, the young man in the army does not need
to serve in the Hui military. By constructing the rebellion as a justified response to
government misbehavior, the Panthay rebels managed to seek legitim acy on the
moral grounds.
Based on these written sources of Panthay Yunnan, it is clear that although
Han-Hui ethnic conflict remarkably influenced the outbreak of the Panthay
Rebellion, the insurgents did not have an obvious political agenda on ethnicity.
Instead, the rebellion showed a significant extent of ethnic diversity and included
members from Han, Hui and Yi groups. The leadership also understated the rebel’s
predominantly non-Han identity and employed extensive Confucian ideology to
justify their uprising as an act to preserve Chinese civilization and livelihood. Given
these facts, to term this uprising as a “Muslim rebellion” is obviously a misnomer
and a cultural prejudice.
PADC.

-47-

The Political Institutions of the Panthay State
Another significant topic of the Panthay rebellion is the foundation of
Pingnan State (pingnan guo), a newborn separatist regime founded by rebels in their
occupied areas. The political structure of Pingnan State is closely associated with the
rebel force, due to the consistent warfare between rebels and imperial troops in the
regime’s 14-year life. Is this regime a “Sultanate” ruled by Muslims founded in
Islamic tradition, as claimed by Western researchers such as Rocher, Anderson and
Atwill? A brief review of prim ary sources will provide some hints on the regime’s
political structure and help answer this question.
The Pingnan regime was officially founded in 1856, shortly after Du Wenxiu’s
troops successfully occupied the city of Dali, the largest city in western Yunnan. He
conferred the city residents and officially accepted the title “General issimo of All
Armed Forces and Calvary” (zongtong bingma

dayuanshuai). Although his

administration was informally referred as “Pingnan State”, he never considered
himself as the leader of a separate country, but rather as the legitimate leader of all
Chinese people. In a diplomatic note to the British Governor of Burma, he styled
himself as “Du Wenxiu, Generalissimo of China” to claim his status as the sovereign
of the entire Central Kingdom. In Du’s inaugural address, he claimed Heaven’s
mandate and pledged allegiance to ancient Chinese sages of Yao and Shun. Du
Wenxiu’s inaugural ceremony generally followed the Confucian tradition and did
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not suggest strong Islamic traits. 56
However, some of Panthay symbols contained certain Muslim elements. One
significant feature is that the official seal of Du Wenxiu was rendered in both
Chinese and Arabic. The Chinese text wrote “Generalissimo Du of All Armed Forces
and Calvary”, while the Arabic text showed his title as “Leader of All Muslims”
(Qa’id Jami al-muslimin). The Arabic script on Du’s seal was frequently cited as an
evidence that Pingnan Regime was an “Islamic sultanate”. However, this argument
ignored the fact that Du Wenxiu, the owner of the seal, was illiterate in Arabic and
only used Arabic calligraphy as a decoration. In most Panthay government decrees
and court verdicts, Classical Chinese was the only language that appeared on the
paper, while Arabic was never used as a working language except for important
religious occasions. Some evidence even showed that Du Wenxiu rarely used that
seal --- in an appointment letter issued in 1862, he used his signature instead of his
seal to authorize the document. Therefore, the half-Arabic signature alone cannot
suggest his political status as an Islamic leader.57
Although the Panthay regime was headed by Hui military leaders, it also
included a large civil bureaucracy in charge of domestic affairs. A complete list of
civil officials in the Panthay regime, compiled by Bai Shouyi, showed two important
features of the bureaucracy. The first feature is that Han Chinese composed the

YPA, Official Se al, Ge neralissimo Du We nxiu (se e Illustration 4); Promotion le tter for Yang Ze ngxi to the
position of Da Sikong.
57 Ibid.
56
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absolute majority of the administration. Among the 195 senior officials appointed by
Du Wenxiu, 176 people were ethnic Han Chinese and 19 were Hui Muslim s. 58 Du
openly emphasized the need to include Han Chinese into the regime, by claiming
that “we need to build trust and emotional ties among the large Han population of
Yunnan”. Another feature is the high level of autonomy on the regional level. Many
sources show that the Panthay administration did not change the political structure
on the county level. The county magistrates appointed by Qing court, as long as they
pledged allegiance to the Generalissimo, were allowed to retain their regional power.
Du Wenxiu also issued patents to indigenous chiefs, which guaranteed their right to
govern themselves and their obligation to pay taxes and provide soldiers.
Based on these limited sources, the Panthay political institution seemed to be
secular, decentralized, and generally multiethnic. Although the regime’s major
leaders were Hui Muslim s, they did not intend transform Yunnan society into an
Islamic one. As an ethnic minority ruling a predominantly Han province, the
Panthay leaders adopted a pragmatic ruling approach and maintained the
established order on the regional level. The view that Du Wenxiu’s regime was a
“sultanate” that attempted to Islamize Yunnan, therefore, lacked historical validity.

IV.

Conclusion

This research attempts to answer one central question: why did the Panthay
58

“Du We nxiu Zhiguan Minglu”, Bai Shouyi and Zhongguo shi xue hui. 1988. Hui min qi yi 回民起義 (The
Muslim Re be llion). Shanghai: She n chou kuo kuang she . Vol.2, 133. An inte rnal publication pre served at
PADC.
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Rebellion – a m assive revolt of Hui Muslim s against the Han-dominated society, take
place in the 19 th-century Yunnan? Instead of seeing this incident as an isolated ethnic
conflict, this study focuses on ethnic identity and explores how one group views the
other in its own cultural context. On one hand, the Hui people strived to be
recognized as a member of the Han Chinese society while maintaining their unique
Muslim characteristics. On the other hand, the ethnic view of Han Chinese only
defined a person as either Han or non-Han and cannot accept a group that possess
both familiar and unfamiliar traits. Therefore, Hui’s increasing involvement in Han
Chinese society only caused the Han population’s anxiety and violent response to
this imagined enemy.
Following the outbreak of Panthay Rebellion and subsequent establishment of
the new regime, the Hui leaders attempted to reconstruct the definition of ethnicity
in Yunnan. The regime reconstructed the concept “Chinese” as one including both
Han and Hui peoples, who shared the common experience of suffering under
Manchu’s barb aric rule. The Panthay leaders also highlighted the Hui’s responsibility
as Chinese subjects to restore China from Qing Dynasty rule. In general, the Panthay
rebellion

was the Hui’s attempt

integrate their

ethnic

identity

into the

Han-dominated society. This research is a preliminary and immature attempt to
examine the role of identity in ethnic conflict, but it will hopefully serve as the entry
point of more comprehensive research on this topic.
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